Abstract -Quality of life in the United disaster requires highly reliable and States relies, in large measure, on the survivable system design of distributed continuous operations of a complex and interdependent systems. This paper infrastructure. This infrastructure is will evaluate specific methodologies for comprised of physical and informationdisaster tolerant systems engineering for based facilities, networks, and assets, improved command and control of which, if disrupted would seriously critical infrastructure systems. The impact health, safety and security of current state of disaster tolerant citizens or effective functioning of application systems is explored governments and industries. This including an investigation into the infrastructure system includes reliability and survivability requirements telecommunications, energy, banking necessary to achieve disaster tolerant and financial, transportation, water, system operation.
. The specific disaster may be caused by multiple goal of these initiatives is to establish points of failure in a system that occur infrastructure systems that continue to very close together in time as well as a provide acceptable levels of service to single point of failure that escalates into customers in the face of disturbances; a wide catastrophic system failure.
natural, accidental or malicious. Adequate means to ensure continued system operation in the event of a The reliance of the nation's critical 2. DISASTER TOLERANT infrastructure systems on fragile information SYSTEMS ENGINEERING and communication systems puts these infrastructures at risk for catastrophic failure. Threats arise from reliance on commercial Fault tolerance of a system is essential to components of unquantified reliability, ensure continued operation and provide unsecured legacy software systems, and a necessary system services despite the lack of understanding of continuously failure of components. The goal of a fault evolving distributed complex networks. All of tolerant system can be defined as the these variables are vulnerable to outside specified degree of resiliency in a system, manipulation through networks and subject to minimizing overhead costs such outsourcing of design.
as duplicate resources, communication, and time overheads [22] . [20] . specification of another model. The authors' Numerous approaches have adequately technique makes available mean and been proven for analytically predicting the variance of each cumulative distribution reliability or availability of series-parallel fault function (CDF) produced in the analysis [21] . tolerant systems where system components are assumed to be independent and the A second method is presented by Sharma et probability distribution of the components al 1991, and introduces a hierarchical are known. These include combinatorial approach for computing the terminal models, such as fault trees and reliability reliability between any given sourceblock diagrams, and the use of Markov destination pair in large, complex networks. models to analyze the system with linear
The method proposed allows the time dependent algorithms [9] [12] [21] .
development of an approximate reliability However, when attempting to model the expression for any large network of any size reliability of complex systems comprised of by modeling the network in a hierarchical non-series-parallel structures these methods form with specified 'clusters' of network are not feasible. The rollback of one process due to failure create the network graph model. Each may cause another non failed process to cluster may then be modeled individually as also rollback. This is due to the a graph which forms the set of cluster communication among the process between models, as seen in Figure 2 [23] .
the times at which the communicating This type of model can be used to model the processes took their checkpoints. A rollback failure and recovery behavior of each node of non failed processes in this manner can lead to an uncontrolled rollback of all the cluster type and predict the expected cluster com an setrof rocesses an as a availability. The availability of a path is the communicating set of processes and an product of the availabilities of the node initiase, whicheisu eptabl to an clusters in the path. The model is developed real-system [23] .
based on the notion of node clusters and real-timesystem [23] .
origin-destination pairs. Reliability terms To prevent the domino effect from occurring corresponding to the paths within a cluster in these systems, the authors' propose the are made disjoint with respect to each other.
use of a planned checkpoint strategy where The advantage of this methodology is the processes mutually agree to perform a realized when attempting to evaluate the checkpoint function whenever any two reliability of large systems. This algorithm processes communicate.
This scheme breaks down a large problem of terminal would ensure that there is no domino effect. reliability in large distributed systems into In the worst case, the processes would sub problems which drastically reduces the rollback to the most recent transition complexity of the evaluation. This process checkpoint before the synchronization and allows for an exact reliability expression to the place just before the next combining reliability information from various jE=-i k#j levels of a system which has been kEC1 previously discussed as being problematic [12] . The goal of this technique is to to the prior density of 0). This assumption improve model consistency at different allows the net contribution of expert opinion levels of the reliability diagram by reto take the form of a binomial likelihood expressing non-terminal node probabilities function so that the aggregation of multiple in terms of probabilities using deterministic opinions can be analytically handled as relations derived from the system reliability 'data' in a suitable format [10] . The final diagram [10] . Four sources of data are sources of data critical to model are the identified to accurately model the system terminal node probabilities (components with using this methodology. The first source is no subcomponents). The combination of data collected from actual component or these sources of data leads to a joint subsystem tests and may generally take the posterior distribution which may be analyzed form of binomial observations. The second to determine an overall system reliability type of data is expert opinion regarding the function [10] . It has been argued that the probability that a specific component or use of Bayesian hierarchical models may be subsystem fails. A third, generally less unrealistic in problems where only partial precise source of information is expert information is available about the system opinion stating that a group of components behavior [23] . in a given system or in related systems have similar failure probabilities. The authors stress the potential importance expert 3. SYSTEMS THEORY AND opinion can play in assessing the reliability CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE of the system, particularly in large complex systems for which data collected on individual components may be sparse. A central tenet of systems theory is However, as this type of data may be communication and control. Regulatory, or available from several experts where the control action, is the imposition of quality of information from each expert may constraints upon the activity at one level of a vary, the model assumes that this data take hierarchy which defines the "laws of the form of a beta density function where behavior" at that level yielding activity prior information obtained from expert m meaningful at a higher level [21] . Hierarchical reliability for the design of systems, when viewed in this manner, can disaster tolerant complex systems offers the be treated as a dynamic process that are ability to include diverse sources of continually adapting to achieve its ends and information at different levels of the system to react to changes in itself and its and an ability to determine overall system environment.
reliability. In addition, traditional systems engineering techniques support the Critical infrastructure networks can be development of a coherent framework for described as complex systems spread incorporating multiple sources of nonacross vast distances which are nonlinear terminal node probabilities using the and highly interactive. Each are composed structure of the system reliability block of numerous cyber, physical, and diagram and terminal node failure time organizational infrastructures subsystems, distributions. Hierarchical reliability interconnected, and interdependent. The evaluation decomposes the overall model interrelation with other sectors constitutes a into a set of sub models where construction complex large-scale system of systems [7] . and generation of a large model is avoided The relationships among these systems are and a solution can be obtained through dynamic, nonlinear and spatially distributed.
interactions analysis among the sub models.
These systems of systems are complex in There is a strategic need to understand the nature defined by the fact that no single societal consequences of infrastructure centralized entity can evaluate, monitor, and failure risks along with benefits of various manage all the interactions [2] .
The tiers of increased reliability.
From an relationships and interdependencies require infrastructure interdependency perspective, complex mathematical theories and control power, telecommunications, banking and methods often not representative of finance, transportation and distribution, and conventional methods. In reliability analysis other infrastructures' are becoming more of such complex systems, combinatorial and more congested and are increasingly models may be computationally efficient, but vulnerable to failures cascading through and have limited expressive power. State-based among them. A key concern is the models are expressive but computationally avoidance of widespread failure due to complex where the complexity increases these cascading and interactive effects. exponentially with the size of the model [12] .
Moreover, interdependence is only one of It is in this regard that hierarchical reliability several characteristics that challenge the modeling may provide the ability to control and reliable operation of these adequately design disaster tolerant systems. infrastructure systems to provide better command and control capabilities including Dealing with system wide disruptions that vulnerability assessment to protect against may potentially result in infrastructure malicious attacks or 
